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ART. IV.—1. *A Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language, adapted to the Use of Colleges and Schools in the United States.* Third Edition, greatly enlarged and improved. By JOHN PICKERING. Boston : Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846. 8vo. pp. 1456.

2. *A Greek-English Lexicon, based on the German Work of Francis Passow. From the English Edition of Liddell and Scott, with Additions.* By HENRY DRISLER, A. M. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1846. 8vo. pp. 1705.

A COMPLETE lexicon of an extensive language, like the Greek, deserves to be ranked, in some points of view, among the rarest monuments of human toil and perseverance. Unpretending as it may be in its appearance, it requires ages for its completion. A pyramid or a temple may be erected in a single generation ; for after the plan of it is once formed, it requires only a sufficient array of physical force to speed the work to its conclusion. But no combination of effort in a single generation can form a complete lexicon of an extensive language. The labors of one generation of scholars form but the scaffolding on which the next generation must stand ; it is by slow approximations only that the work can be brought to a complete state. As it advances, moreover, the contributions required from other branches of knowledge become more and more extensive. Not to speak of the general advance in the science of language, the results of which the lexicographer is expected to embody in his work, each successful investigator in the history or archæology of an ancient nation imposes a new duty on the interpreter of its language. The labors of a Niebuhr, a Müller, or a Becker, require the lexicographer to readjust his materials, and to reconsider in a thousand wearisome particulars the *dicta* which he or other laborers in the same field have before uttered.

Not only, therefore, must a lexicon be an imperfect record of the language of which it treats (for so much is implied in the fact that all knowledge is progressive), but it will ever come short, more or less, of representing fully the state of learning in its own time. It will require a whole generation to embody in a lexicon the knowledge possessed

in this department of Greek studies by the scholars of the present age. Such would be the case, if the only obstacle to be overcome were the physical difficulty of collecting and arranging the scattered items of knowledge, and bringing them into harmonious adjustment with the materials already accumulated. But besides these difficulties, it must be remembered that every improvement is an innovation, and in that character it must somewhat offend every scholar who has an affectionate remembrance of his early guides and helps in the road to learning ; so that error does not stand on its own merits, but is already intrenched in the favorable regards of most of those who have any knowledge of the matter in debate.

The question to be asked, therefore, respecting a new lexicon is not, whether it is defective, or in some respects erroneous ; but, first, How extensive is its aim ? And, secondly, Does it embody in a satisfactory degree the learning of the time in regard to the language in question ?

We have before us, in the two works named at the head of this article, the latest results of American and foreign scholarship in the department of Greek lexicography. We congratulate the student of the Greek language, a language whose great claims were never appreciated with a nicer discrimination than at the present time, on this accession to their means of study. Estimating each of the works with regard to its proposed end, they leave comparatively little to be desired. The first named, the lexicon of Mr. Pickering, may with much justice be called an original work, since the author, in the earlier edition of it, issued twenty years ago, was the first to break away from the usage that had before prevailed, and to present the definitions in English ; and in its present form, the work embodies the best results of his whole life, devoted with singular ardor and success to classical and kindred studies. This work, we believe, will be found to be the best Greek lexicon in the English language for the use of schools and colleges. While it does not aim to embrace the whole circle of Greek literature, it is sufficiently extensive for schools and for the usual wants of students in college. Its execution within its prescribed range is singularly faithful and complete.

The larger lexicon, edited by Professor Drisler, from the English work by Messrs. Liddell and Scott, has been already

briefly noticed in this Review. We will here only add, that for the mature scholar it forms the proper complement to the work of Mr. Pickering. Though not properly a Thesaurus of the language, it is far more extensive and full than any Greek lexicon ever before published, at so low a price as to bring it within the reach of every scholar. In general, we may say that the mature scholar will find here, in all the attractiveness of historical arrangement, whatever he may wish to know in Greek lexicography.

We would not imply, however, that there are not important deficiencies yet to be supplied in this department. The investigations made in lexicography within the last generation, while they have freed the whole subject from much of the confusion in which it formerly lay, and have led the student to recognize a scientific basis for its future treatment, have yet stimulated inquiry rather than satisfied it, and tend to lead the scholar to look to the work yet to be done, more than to any past achievements. At no former period, we believe, would the observation of Coleridge meet with so ready an acceptance among learned men as at the present time ; that the greatest single benefit which learning could bestow on the age would be in the construction of a dictionary of the English language, in which each word should be traced from its root, logically and historically, through all its meanings in the English, and those kindred languages in which it is found. We do not hesitate to say that it is through investigations of this kind, of a wider or narrower extent, that the richest fruits of classical study are to be sought. It is through this intimate communion with the laws of thought and feeling that underlie the conventional usages of languages, that the student becomes an artist, and gains for himself a point of view where he can not only dispense with the aid of critics, but can understand their ignorance.

But before such a work can be done, the ground must be cleared of many obstructions that now occupy it ; and this part of the task is hardly more important than it is difficult. It is remarkable with what tenacity an error once received will hold its place, in the midst of inquiries that would seem sufficient at any time to annihilate its claims and banish it from the field. It seems very excusable, as well as natural, on a subject like language, to receive a positive statement as accurately true ; it is far easier to accept the *dictum* of an-

other than to inquire carefully for ourselves ; hence, important errors are left for ages uncorrected, aggravating the student's labor, and obstructing his progress even in the most beaten path.

We propose to illustrate these remarks by reference to a single topic in Greek lexicography, — the treatment of the prepositions. These words are so extensively employed in composition with verbs and other parts of speech, and are so varied in their uses when standing alone, that they claim a large share of the student's attention. The intricacies they present begin to bewilder the young learner at an early stage of his study. He soon becomes weary in his attempts to find any unity in the diversified materials before him ; and so, instead of gaining sound knowledge, he contents himself with storing up such a multitude of arbitrary definitions as his memory can carry for his use in reading. And in his later progress, there is probably no part of the language which the Greek scholar is less able to discuss in an attractive and intelligent way than this. That this portion of the language has not yet received the elucidation which it needs may be seen in the fact, that it forms an important point in the work of each new laborer in the field of lexicography. The result, however, up to the present time, is a collection of idiomatic usages, rather than the progressive development, in the case of each word, of one leading idea.

To show to what extent this topic is treated in an arbitrary manner, and how little there is of logical deduction in defining the prepositions, we will take for illustration the first that occurs in the lexicon, the preposition *ἀνά*. The primary meaning of *ἀνά* is *up*. This is its original signification as a designation in space ; the signification, therefore, from which, if there is any logical deduction in the case, the other meanings of the word may be traced. How far this is done in our Greek lexicons may be seen by observing how far they furnish answers to the following inquiries. 1. How does the preposition *ἀνά* contribute to the meaning of the following words : *ἀναπορέομαι* = *to journey, or march, from the sea-coast into the interior* ; *ἀναπλέω* = *to sail from port to sea* ; *ἀνοίγω* = *to open*, as a door ; *ἀναπτεράννυμι* = *to unroll*, as a sail, which unrolls downward, and not up ; also, *to flow down*, as the hair when unbound from the head ? 2. Why does *ἀνά* in composition with many verbs give the signification

of *beginning* to the action they express, as ἀνακαίω = *to kindle*, ἀναλάμπω = *to take fire*, ἀνακλαίω = *to set up a lamentation*? 3. How does it follow from the meaning of ἀνά, that the verbs with which it is compounded are, to a remarkable extent, used intransitively? 4. How is it that ἀνά compounded with certain words expresses *opposition*, or *resistance*, as ἀνακρούω = *to thrust back, check*, as a horse, *to put back a ship*, sternwards, by reversing the action of the oars? 5. Why, in a large class of verbs, does ἀνά give the force of repetition to the action of the verb?

Before proceeding farther, it may be well to consider an objection that may possibly be made to this method of inquiry. It may be said, that provided the significations of a word are known, it is of no importance to the student what the logical connection between them is. Let him be content to know the facts, and leave the connection between them as a matter of useless speculation.

It is no credit to our classical culture that such an objection is ever heard; still, it is sometimes made, even by those whose opportunities seem to entitle their opinion to some weight. The answer to the objection is simple. Either language is a product of the rational mind, and hence bears in every feature the impress of reason, or it is a mere chance collection of arbitrary signs, with no rational bond to unite them. If the latter is the true view, then the toilsome and expensive training of our youth in the ancient classical languages, we say, is an immense waste of time and power; if the former view is just, then it is the student's duty at every step of his study of a language to search, by the aid of reason, for the impress of that same reason employed in the production of the language.

And this is not a matter of duty only; it is the student's instinctive desire. The objector has the natural feelings of every learner opposed to him. The learner seeks a reason for every fact, and when he fails to find it, he feels not only that he is a loser, but that he is wronged. He has not found what he knows he has a right to; he has asked for bread, and received a stone. At this point, to meet him with the assertion that there is no reason, such as he is in quest of, is adding insult to injury.

We do not forget the difficulties that may be found in the way of the mode of investigation which is here advocated;

that in many cases the thread is lost that would guide to the arcana of thought, and after our most diligent search, we must rest satisfied with facts whose connection with each other is not seen. This, however, should only make us more highly prize those rays of light which a careful and rigorous analysis may shed on the rational interpretation of language.

To render the point of our inquiry more distinct respecting the Greek prepositions, we will select another, the opposite of ἀνά, and, by a similar set of inquiries to those just gone through, will show the arbitrary manner in which it is usually treated. The primary signification of κατά is *down*. It is from this original meaning that all the other significations of the word, if logically deduced, must be derived. In this connection the following questions present themselves.

1. How does κατά contribute to the peculiar meanings of καταπλέω = *to sail to port*; κατακλείω = *to shut*; καταπορεύομαι = *to come back*; καταπέμπω = *to send from the inland to the sea-coast*? 2. What is the force of κατά in the words κατατέμνω = *to cut up*, or *cut in pieces*; κατεσθίω = *to eat up*, *devour* (the signification of κατά in this word is not *down*, as we shall show)? See also many other compounds of κατά whose meanings are similarly modified. 3. What is the force of κατά in καταφυγή = *a place of refuge*; κατάλαμψις = *a reflection of light*; and why does κατά, more than ἀνά, give a transitive force to the words with which it is compounded?

We have carefully avoided, in the foregoing examples, using any word in which the preposition has its primitive signification. It may be thought that the word καταπέμπω is an exception, as the preposition does designate what is in some degree true in going from the interior of a country to the coast; but we shall show that κατά has a derived, and not its primary, signification here; and it is obvious, *a priori*, that to give it its primary meaning would give a feeble and unsatisfactory interpretation to the word. The idea of *descent* in going from the interior of a country to the sea-coast is not sufficiently prominent to have suggested this preposition to be employed in the descriptive word. The signification of the preposition in each of the preceding examples is derived; and our next object will be to show, by logical deduction, the strict connection that subsists between the primary meaning of the preposition and the secondary mean-

ings which it has in the examples. We begin with the preposition *κατά*.

The primary meaning of *κατά* is *down*. Now, all downward motion has a natural and fixed point, where it terminates; namely, the surface of the earth. Here the falling stone and the falling flakes of snow stop; and here, when it has found the lowest possible point, the running brook ceases to flow. As, therefore, all downward motion has in nature a fixed point of termination, it follows, conversely, first, that all actions which are contemplated purely with regard to their termination in space may naturally be denoted by the preposition that signifies *down*. Hence, *καταπλέω* = *to sail to land*, because that is the natural point where the voyage terminates; *καταπέμπω* = *to send from the inland to the sea-coast*, because there the journey must end; *κατακλείω* = *to shut*, as a door, because the door-post is the fixed point where the motion ceases; *καταπορεύομαι* = *to come back*, that is, to the point which is regarded as the person's resting-place; *κατάλαμψις* = *a reflection*, because the light has met an object and illuminated it. Secondly, actions contemplated merely with regard to their termination, though not in space, are naturally expressed by aid of this preposition. Hence *κατατέμνω* = *to cut in pieces*, that is, till the cutting is done; *κατεσθίω* = *to eat up, consume*,* that is, until the action ceases because there is nothing left to eat; *καταφεύγω* = *to take refuge, to escape*, that is, to flee (*φεύγω*), until the action comes to its natural end, which may either be by reaching some place where the pursuer cannot follow, and then it means *to take refuge*; or, it may be, by distancing the pursuer, and then it means *to escape*.

From the foregoing analysis it is seen why *κατά*, more than any other preposition, gives an intensive, and often a transitive force to the verbs with which it is connected. Other prepositions, as *ἐπί*, *πρός*, point to an object in connection with the verb, but they denote some more specific relation than *κατά*, and consequently do not so often give objective force to the verb. In this connection, we recognize the ground of

* If it is said that *κατά* here means *down*, then the lexicon is wrong in saying that *κατεσθίω* means *to eat up*. The two expressions are perfectly distinct. The preposition *up*, here, has reference to the consumption of the object, the preposition *down* to some implied effort on the part of the agent.

the usage of *κατά* signifying *according to, in conformity with,* as *κατὰ φύσιν, κατὰ τύχην.* As *down* is the natural direction of things in space, every action that is done naturally, fitly, in its own sphere, may properly have this quality signified by the preposition *down*; thus *κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές, κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον,* and other like expressions.

This analysis will rescue from the frigid interpretation that is sometimes given them a class of words in which *κατά* conveys the idea of *disparagement, disapproval, condemnation*; as *κατακρίνω = to condemn; καταδοκέω = to think against one.* It has been said that, in this class of words, *κατά* has its primitive meaning, *down.* This is, at least, an unnatural interpretation, and entirely gratuitous. We have seen, that even in regard to actions which happen in space, *κατά* often loses its primary, and bears a derived, meaning. In actions purely moral, then, we should much more naturally expect to find this derived signification. The word *κατακρίνω* signifies, strictly, *to make one the object of a discriminating judgment*; and this comes to be equivalent to *condemn*, by a well known mental law; namely, that acts of judgment are called forth not by what is in harmony with ourselves, but by what in some way offends us. It is not the innocent whose conduct is marked for special notice, but the guilty; hence, an act of judgment is, in general, an act of blame.

If with these brief indications of a logical treatment of the preposition, we open the lexicon, and examine the mass of explanations arrayed under the word, we shall see at once the want of a better method, and shall find more or less that is erroneous, and calculated only to mislead the student. The following is an instance of this: “*τοξεύειν κατά τυός, κατά σκοποῦ, etc., to shoot at, because the arrow falls down upon its mark.*” Nothing can be worse for the student’s mind than such pretended explanations as this. They cheat him of the knowledge they ought to impart, and what is worse, they substitute an absurdity in the guise of knowledge in its place. The notion of *down* has not the least share in the interpretation of the phrase in question. Grant that the arrow does descend somewhat before it reaches the mark, still this descent is so inconsiderable that it could form no appreciable part of the picture to the observer’s eye; consequently, it could never have suggested the necessity of employing a word to describe it. The true interpretation has already

been suggested ; *κατά* is employed because the mark is the point at which the action is to terminate ; and the genitive case is used, because the *designed*, and not the *actual*, termination is asserted.

We proceed now to examine the uses of the preposition *ἀνά* in connection with its primary signification as applied to things in space. The original meaning of *ἀνά* is *up*. All upward motion has a natural and fixed point of departure ; namely, the surface of the earth. From this as its starting-point it extends into space without any definite limit, or point of termination. All upward motion, then, has a definite beginning, and no definite termination ; it follows, therefore, first, that actions in space which start from a fixed and known point, and pass into indefinite regions, may naturally be expressed by the aid of this preposition ; as *ἀναπλέω* = *to sail from port to sea*, from a fixed and known point of departure into an indefinite region ; *ἀναβαλν* = *to go from the coast into the interior* of a country, applied especially to an army landing, and making its progress into an unknown region ; *ἀνοίγω* = *to open*, as a door. Secondly, actions contemplated as *commencing* will naturally be described by the aid of *ἀνά* ; as *ἀνακαῖω* = *to kindle, to rouse* ; *ἀνοδύρομαι* = *to break out into wailing* ; *ἀναχορέω* = *to begin a choral dance*. Thirdly, as the natural motion of things is downward, an action which opposes a thing in its natural motion may be denoted by this preposition ; as *ἀνακρούω* = *to check*, as a horse by drawing the reins, or as a ship by reversing the motion of the oars. By extending this idea, we come naturally to the notion of *repeated* action ; for if the opposing force be sufficiently increased, it will stop the motion of the thing it opposes, and reverse it, causing it to retrace its former course ; hence, in the fourth place, *ἀνά* gives the idea of repeated action ; as *ἀναμετρέω* = *to measure again* ; *ἀναμάχομαι* = *to renew the fight* ; *ἀναχωρέω* = *to go back*.

In the case of both these prepositions we have taken no notice of instances in which they have their primary signification, these being too obvious to require remark.

In some words, the force of *ἀνά* and *κατά* in composition seems at first view to be nearly the same ; but here a close examination will show that each has its peculiar force. Thus, *ἀναρέω* and *καθαρέω* may both mean *to destroy* ; but the former means to destroy by displacing, the latter by de-

molishing. Consequently, whenever the existence of a thing depends solely on its position and relations, its annihilation may be expressed by ἀναρέω ; for in that case, to remove is to annihilate ; thus, δημοκράτειαν ἀναρέν, not καθαρεῖν. So, too, κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, and ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν, may both mean *through the city* ; but the former expression would have reference to the completion of the action, while the latter would refer to its progress from the starting-point ; the former would naturally be used if the persons were acquainted with the city, the latter, if they were strangers ; the former with the aorist tense, the latter with the imperfect. These are only indications, in a single instance, of those nice distinctions in language which meet the observant scholar at every step of his progress. They suggest to us, if we may so call it, the intense vitality of language,—that it is organized and living to its minutest fibres ; and dictionaries and grammars, after the most elaborate classification, can give us only the lifeless parts, instead of the breathing whole.

Without pursuing the subject before us at length, we will add a few examples, showing the importance, in the treatment of the prepositions, of a rigorous deduction from the primitive signification. The prepositions *περί* and *ὑπέρ* both govern the genitive, and both mean *for* ; as, *περὶ δόξης*, *for glory* ; *ὑπέρ ἐλευθερίας*, *for freedom* ; but each word retains here the traces of its original meaning. As *περί* signifies *about*, it describes our action for a thing to which we have no special or exclusive right, just as our position in space about a thing does not prevent others from holding a similar position. But *ὑπέρ* is exclusive ; it describes action for that to which we have a special right, for what is rightfully our own, as standing over a thing is a natural indication that it is ours. Thus, Demosthenes says the war, at its beginning, was *περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φιλίππου* ; but at the close, it was *ὑπέρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν αὐτοὺς κακῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου*, because the latter was in its nature a thing for themselves to do exclusively of all other persons ; the former, others might do as well as they.

When these prepositions have other significations than *for*, they still show on analysis distinct traces of their original meaning. Thus, in speaking of the judges of Socrates, Xenophon says, “ In whatever things it was not manifest how he thought, — οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν, ὑπὲρ τούτων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραγνῶναι, — it is no wonder that on these points they misjudged about

him." As that *on*, or *over*, which (*ἐπέρ*) a man stands is essential to his position, the preposition *ἐπέρ* is here used to mark the permanent relation between Socrates and certain points of duty and belief, which relation made up his character ; while the transient relation of his judges to him is denoted by *περί*. The prepositions *ἀπό* and *παρά*, both with the genitive case, signify *from* ; but as *παρά*, originally signifying *beside of*, denotes a more intimate relation than *ἀπό*, it is used when a thing is naturally resident in the person from whom it proceeds, — as an inheritance *from* a father, commands *from* a sovereign ; while *ἀπό*, meaning *off from*, denotes a merely superficial relation, and is used when one thing comes accidentally, as it were, from another.

The prepositions *ἐπό* and *πρός* may both, with the genitive case, point to the remote agent, the person who causes the action ; but *ἐπό* merely denotes that the action takes place *under* the person's power ; *πρός* brings the remote and immediate agent *face to face*, and pictures the latter as receiving the command from the mouth of the other. Hence, the whole sad picture presented in the *πρὸς ἀλλῆς ιστὸν ὑφαίνους* of Homer ; where the captive Andromache must stand *before the face of* her mistress, take her commands, and go and do her bidding.

The preceding are but a few instances, which a full discussion of the subject would multiply, showing the importance of a strict logical method in treating of this part of the language. When we say, that this method is essential in order to make sure that the ordinary definitions of words shall be given correctly in the lexicon, it may seem that we assume too much ; the position, however, is strictly true. No amount of toil and care will save the lexicographer from palpable mistakes, unless he has the light of guiding principles. If he starts with an indefinite notion of a preposition, and does not, by logical forecast, keep the field of inquiry narrow before him, his lexicon will show confusion through the whole circle of words into which the preposition enters. Nowhere more than here should the inquirer remember, that *prudens quæstio dimidium est scientiæ*.

We have an illustration of this in hand. The verb *ἀνακλαῖω* is defined in the larger lexicon before us, " *to weep aloud, to burst into tears* ; also, with the accusative, *to weep for, bewail*, — both in Herod. 3. 14." Now the natural question suggested by the analysis of the preposition is, *Is the*

verb ever transitive? We do not mean by this question to imply that it is not, but the preposition *άνα* justifies us in raising the question, and at least asking for the proof. On examining the passage referred to in Herodotus, the word is found *four* times, and in no one of them is it used with an accusative, expressed or understood. Now, this error could not have occurred, had the field of inquiry been properly narrowed in the lexicographer's mind, by a thorough understanding of the force of the preposition *άνα*. Such a knowledge would have thrown the presumption on the negative side of the question, and would at least have saved him from quoting this passage as proof of the affirmative.

But the evil of a defective method, beginning with the lexicographer, goes on annoying and hindering the learner through his whole course ; and the result is, that his knowledge at last is only formal knowledge, and not real. A Greek word in his mind is only a translation of an English word ; not a description of some action or thing which he can see about him. As the reading of history is comparatively useless, until, penetrating through all disguises, we find *ourselves* in the Romans, Greeks, or Persians of the story ; so the study of a language does but little good, if the student fails to find under its strange costume his own thoughts, feelings, and experience. Then the costume is no longer strange ; he has made it his own. It is in this way of learning a new language, that he becomes twice a man.

ART. V.—*The Miscellaneous Works and Remains of the Rev. ROBERT HALL, with a Memoir of his Life, by OLINTHUS GREGORY, LL. D; and a Critical Estimate of his Character and Writings, by JOHN FOSTER, Author of Essays on Decision of Character, &c. London: Henry G. Bohn. 16mo. pp. 572.*

THERE is no phenomenon, in which the usual law of cause and effect seems more utterly set aside, than in the large number of English dissenting divines, who have occupied the same intellectual level with their contemporaries of the national church. There has been, since the birth of